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ANY people are concerned thxt the costs of pro
duction in a number of key industries, snch as agricul-
ture, will exceed the price of the product, thus
destroying entire sectors of the nation’s economy. This
concern has been the basis for numerous public policy
actions,including tariffs and import quotas to protect
domestic producers from foreign competition and
Government guaranteed minimum prices to producers
of farm commodities.
Arguments for maintaining the prices for farm com-
modities at levels sufficient to cover production costs
have been found among those who have had influence
on farm legislation since the early 1920s. Such pro-
ponents include various Secretaries of Agriculture,
major farm organizations, and a number of profes-
sional economists,1
Un 1922, Secretary of Agriculture, Flenry C. Wallace, wrote,
“There is overproduction, so far as the producer is con-
cerned, whenever the quantity produced cannot be marketed
at a price which will cover the production costs Ho
contended that such overproduction will drive the less effi-
cient producers out of business, and that both farmers and
consumers would benefit from more stable farm prices. Sec
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook 1922, p. 4. In
1934, his son, Secretary of Agneulture, Henry A. Wallace,
stated, “Agriculture must be maintained; and to maintain it
the prices paid for farm products must cover the costs.” Like
his father, he also argued that both producers and consumers
would gain in the long run from such supports. See U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Yearbook 1935, p. 4. In the
1920s, a bill was introduced in the Senate to create a Federal
export corporation which was designed to keep farm com-
modity prices at least up to cost of production levels. See
Dan F. 1-ladwiger, Federal Wheat Commodity Programs
(Ames: The Iowa State University Press, 1970), p. 100.
Additional arguments for supporting farm prices at or near
costs of production are found in: Orville Merton Kile, The
Farms By ream Through Three Decades (Baltimore: l’he
Waverly Press, 1948), p. 199; J. A. Baker, “Supply Control:
Farmers Union View,” Journal of Far-rn Economies (Decern-
her 1960), p. 1180; Geoffrey Shepherd, “What Should Co
Into the Parity Price Formula,” Journal of Fana Economies
(May 1953), p. 171; and Rainer Schickele, Agricultural Policy
New York: McGraw-lull Book Company, Inc., 1954).
p. 298. Numerous proponents of price supports contend that
they are necessary in order to maintain a viahle industry.
Such arguments imply that the level of price supports should
be detennined by somo measure of cost of production. See,
for example, John C. White, Deputy Secretary of Agriculture,
“A Gamble That Has to Be Encouraged,” New York Times,
September 13, 1877, He stated: “. ..If we contissue all out
production of commodities in large world oversupply, the
odds are against success and survival for U.S. farmers
The voice of proponents of such price supports has
not gone unheeded. The parity price concept estab-
lished in the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act was in
itself an attempt to relate the Government guaranteed
support prices on farm commodities to avcrage costs.
It provided for a higher support base if farm produc-
tion costs, including interest, taxes on real estate, and
connuodities bought by farmers, rose. The Act, as
amended in 1949, included wages paid to farm labor
in the parity index for agricultural price supports.
The artificially high prices resulting from these pro-
grams led to major surplus accumulation, which in
turn created demands for new legislation to control
production, enhance food consumption, and provide
for surplus disposal through export (subsidy) schemes.
Despite major efforts to reduce surpluses through in-
ternational and domestic surplus disposal programs,
and the massive efforts to prevent stock accumulations
through production restrictions, the value of Govern-
ment owned surplus commodities exceeded $6 billion
or about 20 percent of total farm product sales in the
late 1950’s. Furthermore, total carryover stocks, largely
- under CCC loan or owned outright by the CCC, of
cotton, wheat and sorghum grain often exceed annual
production. In the early 1970s the price for farm
products rose sharply, but the support prices were not
increased much. Consequently, Government stocks of
farm commodities were largely liquidated and most
fanu production controls were removed.
More recently, however, the argument for farm
price supports based on cost of production has been
revised, The Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 pro-
vided for a support price (target price) for feed grains
for the years 1979 through 1981 at the 1978 level of
supports, adjusted for changes in costs of production.
Costs of production for this purpose were defined as
variable costs, machinery costs, and general overhead
costs allotted to the crops involved on the basis of
their proportion of the total value of production.2
2
Food and Agricultural Act of 1977, Conference Report, 95th
Congress, lit Session, Report No. 95—418, p. 19.
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Those who advocate a Government guaranteed
farm commodity price support program based on costs
of production are first faced with the problem of
determining a cost of production measure that has
meaning for any specific fann or commodity. There
are a number of different concepts of costs: total,
average, marginal, fixed, variable, short—run, long-run,
and various combinations.
While none of the proposals for basing snpport price
levels on costs of production state the specific concept
to be used, average cost would apparently he applied,
given the objective of raising farm income through
price supports. The difference between the price per
unit sold and the average cost measures the current
profit (or loss) per unit of output for the faim. Profit
(or loss) per unit multiplied by the number of units
sold yields the total annual profit (or loss) for the
farmer. Thus, price supports based on average cost
could be related to the objectives of the policymakers
of increasing current farm incomes. Nevertheless,
Government guaranteed prices based on any cost of
production concept lead to major problems in the
longer run if guaranteed prices are maintained above
free market prices.
A second problem encountered in basing support
prices on costs of production is the question of whose
cost of production is appropriate. In 1976 there were
about 2.8 million farms in the United States, each
having a different cost structure. While income and
cost data are not available for individual farms, aver-
age realized net income to farm operators in the
various sales classes indicates the diversity of produc-
tion cost. For example, in the largest size category,
with sales of commodities of $100,000 and over per
farm, realized net income averaged 855,700 per farm
operator. But, for those farms having sales of $2,500 to
$4,999, average realized net income per farm operator
was only $1,725)~It is apparent that many fanns in
the latter category realize little or no net income once
opportunity costs (highest valued alternative use for
resources) are deducted for the operator’s labor and
use of capital.~1-lowever, many farms in the larger
size group apparently yield sizable returns to all re-
3
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Income Statistics,
Statistical Bulletin No. 576, July 1977, p. 54.
~The U.S. Department of Agriculture net income data repre-
sent returns to the operator’s labor and equity capital. Hence,
the value of these resources in alternative uses must he
deducted in order to determine the profitability of the farm.
sources. I-Ience, cost of production per unit of output
on larger farms is well below that of most farms in the
smaller size group.
The short-run average cost of production on farms
will no doubt decline as the size of farms in the
smaller farm size groups increase. However, as the
size of farms in the larger size groups increase, man-
agernent is spread over wider areas, and the costs
per unit of output will tend to level off and may even
begin to increase.
The variation in the short-run average cost of pro-
duction for farms results from a number of factors
such as quantity and quality of various inputs, includ-
ing land, labor, operating capital items, and the qual-
ity of management. For example, the quantity of land
and/or equipment will vary among farms, and if there
are major returns to scale, as is often the case in
agriculture, the larger farm will have lower average
costs than will the smaller farm.
Given the fact that some farms are more efficient
than other farms and that the more efficient farms
have lower average prodtsction costs than the less
efficient, Government price supports sufficient to
cover such costs on the more efficient farms might be
set at relatively low levels. For example, some of the
more efficient farms may he able to produce corn
profitably at a price as low as $1.25 per bushel,
whereas other less efficient farms may require a price
of $2.50 or more to produce corn profitably. At these
cost of production levels, price supports set at $1.25
\vill be sufficient to guarantee the profitability of corn
production only on the niost efficient farms.
Alternatively, price supports which guarantee a
profit for the marginal producers (-no farm failures)
will guarantee above normal profits for the more effi-
cient producers. For example, assume that the market
price for corn is $1.75 per bushel and the support
price is set at $2.50 per bushel, a level sufficient to
cover production. cost 0-u the least efficient farm.
Those farms \vhich can p-roduce corn profitably at
$1.25 per bushel will realize profits relative to free
market levels (about $1.25 per bushel), at the expense
of the taxpayers and consumers. Production on these
efficient farms will also tend to rise, since they now
have an incentive to increase output until marginal
cost rises to the new price level. Their marginal cost
will increase as a result of their increased use of van-
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able productive factors such as fertilizer, It will pay
these farmers to increase the use of such resources
until marginal cost (cost of pnodncing an additional
bushel) rises to the support price level of $2.50 pen
bushel. Nevertheless, despite the increase in marginal
costs, these farms will realize a major gain in total
profits. The Government, in turn, would he faced with
disposing of an even larger “surplus.”
I I
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In addition to the fact that support prices based on
cost of production can guarantee large profits to some
farmers while others may still incur losses, the level of
the support price has a major impact on the volume
of farm production. Continuing adjustments in re-
sources and production are made by farmers in re-
sponse to price changes.
In the short run, the way in which such adjustments
are made can be explained by the law of diminishing
returns. This economic law states that as more units
of a variable factor of production (fertilizer, for
example) are applied to a fixed amount of other re-
sources (for example, land), the additional production
per unit of fertilizer added will eventually decline.
This decline in the additional production for each
additional unit of fertilizer means that the cost per
additional unit of crop produced (i.e., marginal cost)
rises.
The marginal cost and the expected price of a
product determine the most profitable rate of produc-
tion, For example, if the expected market price of
corn is $1.75 per bushel and a farmer can produce an
additional bushel of corn by adding $1.50 worth of
fertilizer, lie will add the additional fertilizer. He will
continue to add fertilizer as long as he can increase his
profit by doing so, i.e. until the cost of the fertilizer
added equals the value of the additional corn pro-
duced. On the other hand, no additional fertilizer will
be added once the point is reached where $1.75 worth
of additional fertilizer is required to produce an addi-
tional bushel of corn. The farm’s most profitable short-
run production occurs at that rate of output where the
marginal cost of production equals the price received
for the commodity. This maximizes the farmer’s total
profit, since before that poirst is reached arm)’ additional
rrnit produced adds to profits, -and after that point any
additional output is produced at a loss. Consequently,
when prices are increased as a result of price support
programs, marginal revenue rises above marginal cost
and farmers always find it profitable to increase
production.
In addition to the effect of increasing production,
support prices set above current market prices tend
to reduce the quantity of products demanded from
farmers. In general, the result is an increase in
the amount of farm prodricts supplied to the market
and a decrease in the amount demanded. This differ-
ence will emerge as a “surplus” of current farm prod-
ticts, which the Government must absorb and store or
dispose of.
But of greater consideration is the longer-run ins-
pact of support prices on exports. Higher prices faced
by agricultural producers in those nations which im-
port from the United States, and by such producers in
other nations, provide incentive for increased produc-
tion and decreased importation of farm products from
the United States.5 Hence, stocks of farm commodi-
ties, unwanted at the support price, will tend to build
up. The United States Government can alleviate this
situation by “dumping” farm products in the world
market; that is, the Government can sell fann prod-
ucts in foreign markets at below domestic costs of
production and prohibit the importing of these com-
modities through import quotas or tariff barriers. Some
foreign governments allegedly follow such practices
with respect to some nonfarm products. Several com-
muodities, such as steel and textiles, are allegedly
“dumped” on the United States market.
The market price is the only price which equates
production and sales of all goods and services. While
domestic production restraints, such as acreage con-
trols, may tend to reduce the -commodity accumula-
tions which result from price supports, such controls
have in the past had only limited effectiveness. Fur-
thermore, in those cases where controls are relatively
effective (for example, tobacco production), the in-
centive to produce larger quantities leads to overall
inefficiencies in national resource use.
Prices \vhich are artificially set above market prices
have an important impact on national resource use.
~The new fanu bill contains an escape clause, similar to those
in most tariff laws, which authorizes the Secretary of Agricul-
ture to lower the loan rates when United States farm products
are being priced out of ~vodd markets. However, any price
support level which is above the equilibrium market price will
reduce exports, to some extent, and the higher the support
price is maintained, the greater will be the reduction.
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Average returns to all resources used for farm produc-
tion will rise as farmers bid for additional resources.
More of the variable cost items will be brought into
agriemmlture. For example, it will be profitable for
farmers (in the short run at least) to increase the use
of chemical fertilizer, pest and weed control agents,
and improved seeds, and intensify crop cultivation.
In the longer run, farmers make continuous adjust-
ments of all resources in response to higher prices.
There is neither a unique size of farm, a unique
amount of labor or machinery on fanns, nor a specific
number of farms, nor a specific total acreage in farms.
In other words, oven a longer time period all resources
are variable. If corn is selling below production cost
for some farmers, they will make greater adjustments
in the long run of five years than in the short run of a
year or less. A farmer who is producing at a loss in the
long run will attempt to sell his farm and go into
another occupation, or he may develop his farns into
a profitable one by purchasing land from another rela-
tively inefficient farmer. Hence, without price sup-
ports, long-term adjustments in response to growth in
farm technology result in fewer (but more efficient)
farms, a smaller farm labor force, and lower food costs.
In contrast, the artificially high prices resulting from
farm price supports in the longer run will lead to a
portion of the nation’s scarce resources being em-
ployed, inefficiently, in agriculture. Higher prices,
resulting from price supports, will tend to increase the
farm labor force and other resources. Likewise, the
number of farm consolidations will be slower among
marginal farmers as such farmers will tend to remain
in agriculture for a longer period rather than selling
out. The more efficient farmers, however, will have
the incentive to bid labor and other resources away
from nonfarm uses and increase farm production
capacity. Excessive resources will thus remain in
agriculture. Acreage controls may be used to reduce
the land allocated to crop production but they do not
reduce the incentive for using land or other resources
in the industry. The free market price is the only price
which assures that no waste occurs in the use of scarce
resources.
Since labor and capital can move from one sector of
the economy to another, higher returns to farm labor
through price support programs cannot be maintained
indefinitely. If price supports are set sufficiently high
to cover labor cost (opportunity cost for farm labor)
on the less efficient farms, the more efficient farms
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will find returns from hiring extra labor increased and
will employ additional workers until the value of the
output produced by the last worker hired eqrmals the
cost of hiring the worker. However, once complete,
this process insures that costs of farm labor (wages)
will remain -about the same as the cost of labor
(wages) of the same quality employed elsewhere in
the economy. Otherwise, further shifts in labor be-
tween the farm and nonfarmtm sectors would occur as
workers search for those jobs w’hieh are expected to
maximize their own income. Also new entries into the
labor force will tend to select those occupations where
their own well being is maximized, thereby tending to
equalize returns to labor of equivalent quahty in all
sectors. Consequently, in a community where workers
can move freely among the various occupations, there
can be no permanent disparity in returns to workers
having similar abilities.
Only by limiting employment can labor income in
agriculture be maintained for a long period of time at
above equilibrium levels. However, such rigid con-
trols lead to major inefficiencies in overall resource
use throughout the economy and, in addition, are a
massive infringement on freedom of choice in the
selection of a vocation.
As indicated earlier, over a longer-run period of
perhaps five years or more, all resources in agriculture
are variable. They can be increased on decreased de-
pending on the expected rate of return in agriculture
versus other industries. Labor can readily shift to or
from farming. Gapital invested in farm machinery,
livestock, and other capital items can likewise shift
between farm and nonfarm uses as the capital items
are depreciated or marketed. Land, however, repre-
sents a somewhat different type of investment, being
more of a fixed investment than either farm buildings,
machinery, on livestock. Also, the quantity of land
relative to other forms of capital in agriculture is
greater than in most other industries. Returns to nsueh
of the nation’s land. (opportunity cost) is, thus, largely
determined by its rental value for agricultural pur-
poses. While the effective supply of land for agnicul-
tural purposes can he augmented somewhat through
the use of fertilizer, irrigation, and limited changes in
its use for other purposes, the quantity available for
farming is still relatively inelastic (quantity changes
only a small amount with relatively large changes in
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land prices) even in the long nun.6 l-Ienee, increases
in land prices which result from permanently higher
farm profits tend to be more permanent than the
higher returns on other farm resources.7 The higher
returns to land as a result of price supports thus tend
to remain permanent, whereas returns to other factors
of production tend toward their previous levels, about
equivalent to returns on similar resources used in the
nonfaim sector of the economy.8
The observed adjustments to market forces made
over the years by agriculture -are not consistent with
the view that all farmers \vill suddenly go hankr-upt
and donsestic food production will cease unless costs
of production are guaranteed by the Govensment on
all existing farms. If there were only a few fanners
with the same average cost of production, and farm-
ing in the nation was at a consparative disadvantage
with that in the nest of the world, it would be possible
for them to all fail at the samne time. Then the nation
would be forced to rely exclusively on imports for
food. l-Iowever, in tbis case, well-being would still be
enhanced by importing food and exporting those
goods in which the nation has a comparative advan-
tage. Neither condition, however, is applicable to the
linited States. This nation has more than 2.7 million
farms, each of which has a unique cost of production,
and, as a whole, it has a comparative advantage over
other nations in the production of farm commodities.
°Sce Johmm F;. Floyd. “The Effects of Fanu Price Supports on
the Returns to Lund and Labor in Agriculture,” Journal of
Political Economy (February-December 1965), pp. 152-5o.
~A reduction in crop acrcarme resulting from Government acre-
age control programs ‘vill have a similar impact on returns to
lanrl since any reduction in acreage cropped will result in
higher returns to the remaining acres.
‘
t
For a detailed discussion of this suhiect, see I). Gale Johnson,
Ear,a Gonmmodity Program-s: An Opportunity for Change
Wnslmim-mgton, 0G.: American Enterprise Institute for Fmmblic
Policy Research, 1973), pp. 51-63. Johnson reports, “Since a
vemy large fraction, if not all, of the net benefits from corn—
modmty progran-ms go t:o land, the percentage of farm real
estate that is o\vncd hr farm operators is of sonle interest
perhaps as much as 40 percent of net benefits accn.miog to
land goes to landowners who (10 not farm the land they own:
Floyd fourmd “that most of the benefits (from the price
smrppom’t nod acreage control programs) will take the form of a
wimi.rlfall gain, either an incroase in the value of land or the
receipt of marketing certificates issued by the government
and having a comnmrmc-rcmal valmmc. and that the gain is once
and for all.” Floyd,p. 158.
Similar results ~vcre fos.mnd in a study 1w Earl 0. Heady,
Edwin 0. i-iarnldscn, Leo \-‘. Mayer, and Luther G. Tweeten,
in Rootn of time Fm-nm Problem ( Ames, Iowa: The 1-owa
State University Press, 1965). p. 66.
Its relative advantage is indicated by the fact that
about 30 percent of the nation’s farm production is
exported.
Since average cost of production per unit varies
wide]y among the numerous farms in the nation, some
farmers will he making profits in a free market setting,
while others will take losses at all likely prices for farm
products. Only the marginal (least profitable) ones
will cease production in any year, however, and find
other uses for their re-sources. As marginal producers
leave the industry, the supply of farm products will
tend to decline. The decline in supply will tend to
increase the price and the profit ]evel to the remaining
producers. Consequently, the larger the number of
failmmres in any given year the greater will he the
profits in succeeding years for those producers remain-
ing in agriculture. Hence, the system is self-adjusting
if left alone. Consumers thus have no need to fear
from the possibility of massive failure in farm produc-
tion resulting from free market forces.
Much of the support for Government farm pro-
grams no doubt reflects the benevolent concern of the
American public for the relatively large number of
low-income farm families. Failure in agriculture by
such families is often envisioned as a catastrophe. No
farm nor business failure is desirable for its own sake
since it is associated with personal costs and losses.
But, there is little that the commodity supply-control
and price-support programs can c1o to prevent failcres
by the l.ow-income farm group. They own little land
and it -is the existing landowners who receive the
major benefits from farm price-support programs.
i-Ience, the economic status of the low-income fann
families is little improved.
Furthermore, there is a social cost in preventing
failure that should he weighed against the losses from
failure. As indicated earlier, farms, like other busi-
nesses, can,- muisuse labor, land, capital, and other fac-
tor inputs. Unl.ess some failures arc perm~tteci,such
misuse will continue, and the resources will not be
available to other sectors of the economy-, where they
could be used more efficiently.
The various sectors of the economy grow at differ-
cut i-ates — some at a high rate, some more slowly
and some not at all. If no failure is permitted by assur-
ing market returns to -all resources, growth in the
faster growing sectors of the economy will he retarded
because of lack of resources, Thus, programs which
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tend to support farm prices at production cost and
freeze the resources in farming at their current levels
are not compatible with maximum economic growth
or well-hemg. I-Ience, the cost to society of preventing
failure may he much greater than the hardships of the
relatively small number of failmmnes which result from
price competition in the market place; and if we wish
to ameliorate the hardships, it can he done by more
efficient means than by subsidies to all farms. Exam-
ples~are Covernment grants and loans for retraining
and relocation of farmers and farm workers.
Arguments have been made for Government farm
price supports based on cost of production. Some of
the arguments are based on the alleged possibility of
massive failure and loss of production in the industry.
The arguments fail to specify rvhich cost or whose cost
of production should detennine the level of supports.
There are several different concepts of cost of pro-
duction. Possibly the mos-t widely understood concept
is average cost. But there are more than two million
farms in the nation,each with a different average cost.
Flence, any likely level of price support selected for a
farm commodity will he above average cost for some
farms and below average cost for all others.
Consequently, any farm price—support level which
may be selected contains all the handicaps of all other
DECEMBER 1977
price-support schemes. Any level of price supports
which is above marketlevels for a commodity will tend
to increase output and raise marginal costs of produc-
tion. Hence, the price supports themselves, if effective
in raising prices, stimulate the production of “surplus”
commodities, and result in higher food costs, reduced
farm commodity exports, and higlmer taxes to cover
the higher Covernwent ommtlavs.
In addition, the supports cause inefficiencies in both
the fann and the nonfarm sectors of the economy and
fail to achieve the objectives of the program. They
lead to excessive resources in agriculture which re-
duces the quantity of resource~sav-ailahleto the non-
farm sector of the economy. Consequently, there is
less production of nomifaim goods. But of greater im-
portauee, the higher prices are of little benefit to farm
labor and low—income farm families, major objectives
of the program. Most of the gains accrue to existing
landowners.
Furthermore, the supports are not necessary to pre-
vent massive failures. The system of market prices is
self-correcting, as failures tend to reduce the overall
supply, increase the price of farm products, and im-
prove the profitability of the remaining farmns. Some
failures and some temporarily high profits are to he
expected in a competitive economy. They indicate
that resources are moving toward their most efficient
uses.
/
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